

Discussion of:
Financial Technology and the 1990s Housing Boom
by Stephanie Johnson

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The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System.

Overall reactions

Very interesting paper studying the effects of automated mortgage underwriting

→ Part of growing research interest in AU (Foote et al. 2019; Bhutta et al. 2021)

Among the things to like about the paper:

1. **Important, specific**, technological innovation in mortgage lending
 - Literature often vague about how technology affects credit supply – e.g., *“technological advancements in risk management”* (Mian & Sufi 2009)
2. Exploits some nice institutional features that can aid in identification
 - AU led to change in lending standards for Freddie but not (initially) for Fannie
 - “Assignment” to AU system significantly driven by historical GSE relationships
3. Serious investment by Stephanie in mastering the historical details

Putting the paper in context

- Two channels (at least) through which technology could affect lending:
 1. Allows lenders to adjust standards, reshape credit surface
 2. Increases underwriting speed/efficiency, makes process smoother, reduces costs
- Recent innovation I think is mostly about **channel 2** (e.g., Quicken)
- This setting: both **channel 1** *and* **channel 2**
 - e.g., Fannie initially adopts AU just to automate existing standards
 - Can you say anything about relative role of 1 vs 2?
 - Would be nice to frame paper relative to recent “fintech” research (e.g., Buchak et al., 2018; Fuster et al. 2019; Jagtiani et al. 2019 etc.)

Effects of automated underwriting: peeling back the onion

Step 1: Firm-level effects on lending & standards for AU “early adopters”



Step 2: Effects on *aggregate* lending




Step 3: Effects on home prices

Main suggestion: Focus more on pinning down step 1 and step 2

Step 1: Did AU induce increase in credit supply for early adopters?

- Paper finds earlier Loan Prospector (Freddie) adopters experience:
 1. 70% higher lending growth between 1993-96 [\[table 5\]](#)
 2. Increase in proportion of high-LTI + low income lending [\[table 6\]](#)
- Challenge: AU adoption endogenous. Essential to convince reader of causality here
- Suggest trying to beef up. E.g., three suggestions re Table 5 (lending growth):
 1. Show results for Desktop Underwriter early adopters too (better control group)
 2. Present year-by-year results (even if just in aggregate). Test for pre-trends
 - Y-b-Y elsewhere, why not here? Dummy for county = missing? Start earlier in time?
 3. Be careful of log specification ... consider Poisson (e.g., Cohn et al. 2021)

The Good Word on poisson



Step 2: Did AU affect *aggregate* lending volumes / standards?

- Are magnitudes reasonable?
 - County-level $\log(\text{LTI})$ already up 26.5 in 1994 [table 8]. Too early? And much larger than individual lender effect, even though LP adopters usually $<5\%$ market share?
 - Large effect on $\log(\text{LTI})$ in 1994-96 but no effect on $P(\text{LTI} > 3)$ in same period?
- Would be nice to show results for lending volume, not just LTI
- Any way to look at effects on stock of loans, in addition to flows?
 - E.g., American Housing Survey, which covers this period?
 - Adelino et al. (2016 RFS) and Foote et al. (2020 REStud) show distinction flow and stock of loans can matter a lot

Step 3: Did credit growth caused by AU lead to higher home prices?

- Similar comment – are the magnitudes and timing of results reasonable, given the small initial share of “early adopters”?
- Place your results in context of papers estimating $\Delta\text{home prices}$ / Δcredit .
 - Greenwald and Guren (2021); Di Maggio and Kermani (2017); Favara and Imbs (2015); Adelino, Schoar and Severino (2015) etc.

Other thoughts & questions

- Timing: What is “right” start & end of Loan Prospector (LP) natural experiment?
 - **Start:** Loan Prospector released in 1995, but pilot in 1994. But initial standards in LP were quite tight, and gradually relaxed over time (from 1995-2000)? When “should” effects start showing up?
 - **End:** Eventually Fannie also changes standards, and many other lenders adopt AU. When is “early adopter” variable no longer relevant?
- Suggest replacing key tables with “event study” graphs tracing out dynamics

Wrapping up

- Automated underwriting was a big deal!!
 - Large changes in weights on different credit variables in span of only a few years
 - Backdrop: (i) large rise in homeownership; (ii) start of acceleration in home prices
- Stephanie's paper is a really nice contribution towards understanding this period and measuring the effects of AU.

Thanks!