

Discussion of:
The Effect of LTV-Based Risk Weights on House
Prices: Evidence from an Israeli Macroprudential
Policy

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The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System.

1. What do macroprudential policies do?

Table 1.1. Macroprudential Policy Tools

Number of macroprudential policy tools in use, 2018	>3	1–3	0	
Level of the countercyclical capital buffer, 2019 (percent)	>1	0–1	0	
Economy	Counter-Cyclical Capital Buffer	Nonbank Financial Sector Tools	Household Sector Tools	Corporate Sector Tools
Australia				
Austria				
Belgium				
Brazil				
Canada				
China				
Denmark				
Finland				
France				
Germany				
Hong Kong SAR				
India				
Ireland				
Italy				
Japan				
Korea				
Luxembourg				
Mexico				
Netherlands				
Norway				
Poland				
Russia				
Singapore				
Spain				
Sweden				
Switzerland				
Turkey				
United Kingdom				
United States				

1. What do macroprudential policies do?

- Widespread use of macropru policies, often via housing finance
- **What do these policies do?**
 - Reduce credit growth, and if so, how much? Asset prices? Default?
 - Improve financial stability, or just induce regulatory arbitrage?
 - How quickly do policies work? Long and variable lags?
 - Policy design: *Which* tools are most effective?
- Growing body of research uses micro-data to study these questions
 - **Laufer & Tzuer-Ilan 2019**, Acharya et al. 2019; Armstrong et al. 2019; Van Bakkum et al. 2018; Basten & Koch 2014 ...
- Future: Meta-analysis to understand variation in effects across countries and types of policies

2. This paper

- **Policy:** 100% risk weight if $LTV \geq 60\%$ AND loan balance $\geq 800k$.
- **Empirical strategy:** Use home value to calculate likelihood this dual condition would have been met in absence of policy:


$$P(\text{mortgage}_i \geq 800k \ \& \ LTV_i \geq 60\%) = f(\text{home value}_i) \quad (1)$$

where $f(\cdot)$ is constructed from “pre-policy” distribution of LTV

- Resulting “ $treatment_i$ ” variable ranges between 0 and 0.45.
- **Finding:** Prices drop for properties affected by the LTV policy.
 - Magnitude: $treatment_i \times post_t = -0.031$

3. Constructing the counterfactual

Would prices for high- and low-value homes have moved in parallel in absence of LTV policy? (would $treatment_i \times post_t = 0$?)



Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

Suggestion: Formal tests for parallel trends as in e.g., Autor (2003)

- Interact $treatment_i$ with vector of time dummies. Interaction effects zero before policy implementation? Trace out path over time.

4. Hedonic model

Treatment $\neq 0$. Log-linear hedonic model seems misspecified.

	PPSM	PPSM	PRICE	predicted price	
	PPSM	PPSM	PRICE	PPSM	PRICE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
3.roomsgroup	-0.183*** (0.00598)	-0.101*** (0.00603)	0.233*** (0.00660)	-0.0591*** (0.00643)	0.170*** (0.00847)
4.rooms_group	-0.345*** (0.00775)	-0.179*** (0.00815)	0.441*** (0.00930)	-0.0789*** (0.00748)	0.525*** (0.00852)
5.rooms_group	-0.490*** (0.00851)	-0.241*** (0.00927)	0.570*** (0.0107)	-0.0811*** (0.00833)	0.804*** (0.00909)
lnage	0.00371*** (0.000810)	-0.00346*** (0.000887)	-0.0126*** (0.00111)	-0.00741*** (0.000991)	-0.0254*** (0.000459)
Treatment	0.156*** (0.00623)	0.744*** (0.0175)	1.010*** (0.0176)	0.744*** (0.0170)	1.012*** (0.0176)
After	0.0812*** (0.00360)	0.0998*** (0.00362)	0.0940*** (0.00380)	0.0959*** (0.00287)	0.0846*** (0.00363)
TreatmentAfter	-0.0404*** (0.0108)	-0.0309*** (0.0119)	-0.0235*** (0.0092)	-0.0212*** (0.0095)	-0.0287*** (0.0042)

Suggestion: Estimate richer hedonic model to capture nonlinearities.

- E.g.,: (i) Interaction effects, (ii) include transformations of sqm, (iii) machine learning methods.

5. Endogeneity of *treatment_i* variable

Authors run regressions of the form:

$$\ln(\text{price}_i) = \alpha \cdot \text{treatment}_i + \beta \cdot \text{treatment}_i \times \text{post}_t + \gamma X_i + e_i \quad (2)$$

But *treatment_i* is itself a function of the property price! Violates orthogonality assumption that $E[e_i | \text{treatment}_i] = 0$.


Suggestion: Always construct *treatment_i* using predicted property value based on property characteristics e.g.,:

$$\widehat{\text{price}}_i = h_{pre}(X_i) \times (1 + \text{agg. price growth}) \quad (3)$$

Variation of this is implemented but only in a small part of the paper (method also not very transparent).

6. Data puzzles

- **Suggestion:** show graphically evidence of mortgage bunching right below policy threshold = $\max(800k, \text{home value}/0.6)$
- Data puzzles? e.g., see below: bunching significantly $< 800k$
 - An artifact of kernel smoothing or something else?



7. Summing up

- Interesting paper examining a nice natural experiment. Some work to do to further refine analysis and isolate effect of LTV policy.
- Paper contributes to growing literature using applied micro methods to evaluate macroprudential policies:
 - Expect much more work, given widespread macropru + micro data.
- **Long-term goal:** Assemble an integrated body of evidence to tell us which macro-prudential policies are effective and how they work.

Appendix: Additional suggestions for authors

- Include table of summary stats for all variables used in analysis
- What can you say about effective shadow cost of capital. E.g. compare to Grancy and Kurtzman paper for the US looking at HVCRE. (Maybe more relevant to other Tzur-Ilan paper).
- You only study the initial macropru policy but there were others as well – why not study all of them? Additional identification.
- You have multiple papers on these policies – may be better to combine together? (E.g., would be nice to have interest rate evidence here as well).